Abstract. Sudden reversals in banks' leverage cycle are modelled as the result of tensions between the abundance of liquidity and the limited capacity of the banking sector to process this liquidity and re-allocate it internally through the interbank market. I use the model to analyze the e ects of nancial integration of emerging market and developed economies. Financial integration permits a more e cient allocation of savings worldwide in normal times, but also entails capital ows toward developed economies. Financial crises occur when capital in ows exceed the developed countries' absorptive capacity. Implications in terms of nancial fragility, welfare, and policy interventions are discussed.
1 ( gure A). As a result, broker-dealers' total assets rose dramatically, up to 90% of US quarterly GDP in mid-2007 ( gure B) . These developments came along with the greater importance of broker-dealers in the supply of credit to the real economy, as documented by Adrian and Shin (2008b) .
Feature 2 (External imbalances):
The United States has run a persistent current account de cit since the early 1990s. Figure C illustrates this evolution as a ratio of world GDP. Starting at the end of the 1990s, the counterpart of these de cits has been mainly driven by large surpluses in Asian emerging market economies.
Feature 3 (Domestic imbalances):
The nancial deepening process in the run-up to the recent crisis was not accompanied with comparable changes in the real sector. On the contrary: although US labour productivity growth was positive throughout the last decade it started to decline signi cantly in 2004 ( gure D), falling from an average year-on-year growth rate of 1.65% in [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] to a year-on-year growth rate of 0.9% in [2005] [2006] [2007] . Dupont et al. (2011) document this productivity slowdown and the convergence of US productivity growth rates toward euro zone levels.
Feature 4 (Liquidity dry-up):
The crisis materialized itself as a sudden and complete freezing of liquidity in key nancial markets (see, e.g., Gorton and Metrick, 2009) , an abrupt deleveraging in the market-based banking sector ( gures A and B) as well as falls in international trade ( gure C), productivity, and aggregate output ( gure D).
The sudden change from boom to collapse has been so remarkable that one representation of the crisis is a model with two possible equilibria, one close to a frictionless nancial market with an e cient allocation of resources, and the other characterized by a collapse in trade (Portes, 2009 , Gorton, 2010 . In the present paper I formalize this idea, and model nancial fragility as the coexistence of two self-ful lling multiple equilibria on the wholesale nancial market. The model is simple and ultimately boils down to the standard nexus between aggregate supply and aggregate demand of funds. The crucial, non standard feature of the model is the form of the aggregate demand curve, which is hump-shaped due to market frictions. In other terms, aggregate demand reaches a maximum for some rate of interest, re ecting the limited absorptive capacity of the wholesale nancial market. The nancial market is shown to be fragile and subject to runs whenever the supply of funds exceeds its absorptive capacity, which depends on the productivity of the real sector, the ultimate borrower of funds. I build the model in two steps. The rst step consists in modelling capital ows among competitive heterogeneous banks through an interbank market. The model is static, has one period, and involves only one country. There is a continuum of banks born with some initial wealth. Each bank has access to a speci c retail loan market and a speci c and non-diversi ed pool of entrepreneurs. A bank may lend its resources either to entrepreneurs or to other banks on the interbank market. This market develops because banks are heterogeneous with respect to the probabilities that their respective pools of entrepreneurs default on retail loans. The expected returns on retail loans depend both on these default probabilities and on aggregate productivity in the real sector. Given these returns, banks may choose to be either on the demand side or the supply side of the interbank market. 0% 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Basically, banks with risky retail lending opportunities prefer to lend to other, more e cient banks rather than to their own pool of entrepreneurs. In contrast, e cient banks prefer to borrow on the interbank market in order to increase the size and total return of their retail loans. While the interbank market overall improves the allocation of liquidity among banks, it is also subject to frictions that prevent the economy from reaching the First Best allocation. Two types of frictions are considered jointly: moral hazard and asymmetric information. Moral hazard arises because of limited contract enforceability. It is assumed that borrowing banks may misuse ("divert") the funds raised on the market, e.g. by investing into sub-prime mortgages. The net opportunity cost of diversion depends on the degree of contract enforceability, the expected return on retail loans, and leverage. To raise funds banks must discipline themselves by limiting their leverage (typically, banks must "have enough skin in the game"). The moral hazard problem alone is unable to generate self-ful lling multiple equilibria, though. In e ect, what makes banks' beliefs matter in the model is that information is asymmetric, in the sense that lending banks do not observe borrowing banks' expected returns on retail loans. Although lenders do not know individual borrowers' true quality and incentives to run away, they are able to infer the average 3 borrower quality from the market return. For example, in a low market return environment even ine cient banks may prefer to borrow and operate on their retail loan market rather than lend on the interbank market, and so low interest rates arouse counterparty fear. Multiple self-ful lling equilibria arise from lenders' beliefs about borrowers' quality. If lenders believe that borrowers are safe and do not need to be incentivized -a case of low counterparty fears, then they will tolerate high leverage and borrowers will be able to demand large loans. Aggregate demand for funds will be high, and so will the equilibrium market return. Since high market returns keep risky bankers away from the demand side, counterparty risk will indeed turn out to be limited. This equilibrium is what I will refer to as a "normal time" equilibrium. It is characterized by a deep interbank market and highly leveraged market-based banks (feature 1). In contrast, pessimistic beliefs may also be self-ful lling, trigger a market run, a sudden liquidity dry-up, and a deleveraging process that are consistent with the observed developments in the nancial sector during the recent crisis (feature 4). Such coordination failures are only possible when real sector productivity is too low, i.e. below what would be needed to maintain borrowers' incentives (feature 3).
In the second step, I analyze the e ects of international capital ows on nancial fragility. To do so, I extend the basic setup to a two-country framework. The two countries are identical (i.e. they have the same size, technology, distribution of banks, etc.), except with respect to the degree of development of their respective domestic nancial systems. Contract enforceability is assumed to be weaker in the less nancially developed ("emerging") country than in the nancially "developed" country. In this context, nancial integration is accompanied with positive net capital ows from the emerging to the developed country (feature 2) that improve the allocation of savings worldwide. However, under some conditions that will be discussed, current account imbalances are shown to generate nancial fragility. The reason is that by exerting downward pressures on interest rates and market returns capital ows from the emerging country give ine cient and risky banks incentives to borrow funds. The mere possibility that such banks may enter the demand side of the market feeds counterparty fears and makes the nancial market prone to coordination failures and freezing. Overall, nancial crises result from tensions between foreign capital in ows on the one hand and the capacity of domestic banking sectors to process these ows and re-allocate liquidity internally through the interbank market on the other hand.
Related literature. The core modelling of the nancial market is inspired from Aghion and Bolton (1997) , where agents can choose to be borrowers or lenders. This feature is crucial in the present model to the extent that endogenous switches of risky banks from the supply to the demand side of the interbank market are the cause of sudden rises in counterparty fears and liquidity dry-ups. The moral hazard problem builds upon Holmström and Tirole (1997) , with the di erence that the private bene t from diversion is endogenous. A number of recent papers have used the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework as a basis to model the interbank transactions that emerge when banks face liquidity shocks. This framework has also proved particularly useful to model market liquidity problems due to re sales and cash-in-the market pricing (e.g. Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005 , Castiglionesi et al. 2010 , Malherbe, 2010 . Here, in contrast, the focus is on banks' funding liquidity problems. I do not assume idiosyncratic ex post liquidity (preference) shocks to make the interbank market emerge. Instead this market develops ex ante because banks' intermediation technologies are idiosyncratic: some banks have better retail loan opportunities than others. For this reason, the interbank market can be viewed more broadly as a wholesale nancial market, rather than as a short term money market. In this context, market runs will take the form of sudden increases in margin requirements, as opposed to early fund withdrawals.
This paper belongs to the literature that diagnoses reversals in market-based bank leverage (or margin requirements, or haircuts) as the core mechanism behind the recent nancial crisis and the collapse of a number of segments of the wholesale nancial market (e.g. repo, asset backed commercial paper, etc.). In this recent literature leverage may reverse following an exogenous, adverse aggregate shock when banks nance long term assets with short term debt instruments (i.e. when there is a maturity mismatch) and face margin requirements Shin, 2008a, Geanakoplos, 2009) . Here, in contrast, reversals in leverage follow upon the coordination failures and switches from the normal to crisis times equilibria that may occur when there is too much liquidity available in the interbank market. 1 Bebchuk and Goldstein (2010) also explain sudden funding liquidity problems by coordination failures, but they focus on the retail loan market. Another important aspect of the present paper is to connect the literature on leverage cycles and the collapse of the wholesale nancial market with that on global imbalances Mendoza et al., 2009) . The model proposed here helps understand the e ects of foreign capital in ows on the fragility of domestic nancial sectors. Mendoza et al. (2009) show that nancial integration can lead to large global imbalances when countries di er in the degree of domestic nancial development. However, they do not discuss the causal link between global imbalances and nancial fragility. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) analyze the relationship between external imbalances and nancial fragility but in their paper the de nition of nancial fragility is di erent. It refers to the developed economy's banks selling safe assets to foreign investors while keeping the equity part of their domestic retail loans, which makes them more exposed to bad exogenous domestic shocks. In their work there is no interaction between banks and no modelling of the interbank market. Castiglionesi et al. (2010) show that nancial integration makes systemic crises less likely but more extreme. Their setup is di erent: by allowing risk sharing and cross-country liquidity insurance, nancial integration gives banks incentives to increase their lending and balance sheet's maturity mismatch, which reduces banks' resilience to exogenous aggregate shocks. However, as they consider the nancial integration of identical countries, there is no current account imbalance and no discussion on the link between the nancial integration of emerging market economies and global imbalances.
1 The idea to model the crisis as a sudden regime switch is also favoured by Gorton (2010, page 20) , who notes that "a lot of macroeconomists think in terms of an ampli cation mechanism. So you imagine that a shock hits the economy. The question is: What magni es that shock and makes it have a bigger e ect than it would otherwise have? That way of thinking would suggest that we live in an economy where shocks hit regularly and they're always ampli ed, but every once in a while, there's a big enough shock . . . So, in this way of thinking, it's the size of the shock that's important. A "crisis" is a "big shock." I don't think that's what we observe in the world. We don't see lots and lots of shocks being ampli ed. We see a few really big events in history: the recent crisis, the Great Depression, the panics of the 19th century. Those are more than a shock being ampli ed. There's something else going on. I'd say it's a regime switch-a dramatic change in the way the nancial system is operating."
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The present paper shows both how the nancial integration of such countries generates current account imbalances and how these imbalances make the nancial system more fragile. Finally, Martin and Taddei (2010) recently analyzed the e ects of nancial integration on business cycles when credit markets are subject to both moral hazard and asymmetric information. However, they do not model market freezes and restrict their analysis to the case of a small open economy.
Outline of the paper. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the baseline one country model. Section 3 presents the extension to two countries and analyzes the e ects of nancial integration on global imbalances and nancial fragility. Section 4 includes a discussion on the empirical implications of the model and its usefulness to understand the e ects of policies such as capital controls and Basel III. Section 5 concludes.
Model Setup
I consider a competitive economy populated with a mass one continuum of risk neutral agents, who live one period from date 0 to date 1. There is one good in the economy, which agents may consume at date 1. For an expositional reason that will be explained in a moment, I interpret agents as bankers. It will be convenient to think of each banker as living on an island populated with one local, representative entrepreneur. Hence there is a continuum of bankers, entrepreneurs, and islands. I will index bankers, entrepreneurs, and islands by , with
Every entrepreneur has one project that requires some initial investment at date 0 but does not have any wealth at date 0 to self-nance this investment. In contrast, every banker is born with one unit of good as initial wealth at date 0, which he may either store or lend to his local entrepreneur. It is assumed that a given banker cannot lend directly to the entrepreneurs on other islands. Every unit of good stored at date 0 yields one unit of good at date 1. In the rest of the paper, I will interpret the good stored as "cash". Bankers are heterogeneous with respect to retail loans' expected returns, in the sense that retail loans on island pay o units of goods at date 1 (per unit of good lent) with probability , and nothing with probability 1 . I will interpret as capturing real sector's productivity; it is invariant across islands. There are several ways to interpret probability . It may re ect entrepreneur 's idiosyncratic productivity. Or it may re ect banker 's skills in monitoring and supporting the entrepreneur's project. The more skillful banker , the higher the probability of success of entrepreneur 's project. (In this latter case, could re ect the quality of the bank lending relationship in island .) From a technical standpoint these two interpretations are immaterial for what will matter is that banker 's retail loan portfolio may not yield anything at date 1 -this assumption that banker 's retail loan portfolio is not diversi ed will play an important role in the analysis. This heterogeneity creates scope for an interbank or, more generally, a wholesale nancial market to develop, where skillful bankers borrow from unskilled, ine cient bankers. For simplicity, the s are assumed to be uniformly distributed over interval [0 1] and, to make things interesting I assume that storage is an ine cient technology, i.e., Assumption 1 (Productivity Parameter): 1 I denote by the gross interest rate paid on interbank loans, and by the expected gross return on interbank loans. These interest rates are endogenous. Because returns on retail loans are stochastic and bankers may default on their interbank debt, is lower than . Moreover, cannot be above the return on retail loans (otherwise, there would be no demand for funds) and cannot be below that on storage (otherwise there would be no supply). Hence, one has (provided that the interbank market exists): 1 6 6 6 . 2 By raising funds on the nancial market skillful bankers are able to extend their supply of funds on their respective retail loan markets and to increase their expected returns from retail lending. I call such bankers "borrowers" and denote by the amount borrowed by banker per unit of initial wealth. Because is the ratio of market funding to banker's equity, I will call it "leverage"; it is endogenously determined and would depend on in a world with symmetric information. Leverage is perfectly and publicly observable and, therefore, contractible upon. (In other terms, each lender can observe how much other lenders have lent to a given borrower or, equivalently, the total size of the borrower' balance sheet.) For unskilled bankers it may be more pro table to lend on the wholesale nancial market rather than use the storage technology or lend to the domestic entrepreneur. I will call such bankers "lenders". The higher (lower) , the higher (lower) banker 's expected return on retail loans, and the more incline is banker to borrow (lend) from (to) other bankers. Therefore there will exist an endogenous cuto level , above (below) which bankers borrow (lend). This endogeneity of the distribution of lenders and borrowers is a crucial feature of the present model. Assumption 2 (Banker 's Decisions): Bankers take the market return (as well as the market rate ) as given. Given (and ) banker decides whether, and how much, he borrows or lends so as to maximize his expected pro t.
Assumption 2 that bankers are price takers is consistent with them being atomistic and competitive in the wholesale nancial market. I will denote by { } the decision to lend (i.e. = ) or borrow (i.e. = ) on the wholesale nancial market, and by the amount borrowed by banker per unit of wealth, with > 0. I do not exclude a priori that is a function of but I omit the for notational purpose. Banker 's objective consists in maximizing his date 1 expected pro t max
with respect to his decisions and , where 1 = is a dummy equal to one if = and zero otherwise. If banker becomes a lender, then it is optimal for him to lend all his wealth, so that his expected return is equal to . If banker becomes a borrower on the wholesale market and nances his island's entrepreneur, then his expected return is equal to ( + ( )), where is the borrower's rent per unit of leverage. Because this rent is positive it is always optimal for borrowers to lever as much funds as possible. In a frictionless world the most skillful banker 2 In particular, in a frictionless world the expected returns on interbank loans depend on the s and non-arbitrage requires they be the same across all bankers, i.e. ( ) = (see appendix 7.1).
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would be able to borrow the full amount of savings available in the economy, and the economy would reach the First Best allocation: only the safe entrepreneur ( = 1) would be nanced. To make things interesting, I assume that the wholesale nancial market is subject to frictions that prevent the economy from reaching the First Best. Two types of frictions are considered jointly: moral hazard and asymmetric information. The benchmark economies when there is no friction, when there is asymmetric information only, and when there is a moral hazard problem only are analyzed in Appendix 7.1. As shown in this appendix, the outcomes of these economies are fairly straightforward and none of them features multiple equilibria. Therefore, for the sake of space, I focus on the economy with both frictions; these two frictions are described below.
Moral Hazard. The moral hazard problem resembles Holmström and Tirole (1997) 's. I assume that bankers have to raise funds on the interbank market before they can lend to their respective entrepreneurs on the retail loan markets at date 0, and that they cannot commit to lending to entrepreneurs. More precisely, once they have raised funds on the interbank market they have the possibility to run away, store the funds aside, and consume the proceeds of storage at date 1. I will refer to this as cash diversion. Concrete examples of such private bene ts would be the commissions levied by brokers on abusive mis-selling of mortgages, credit cards, and other loan products. 3 The moral hazard problem takes place ex ante, as described in Table 1 . Following diversion, borrowers do not pay their debt and lenders do not get any payment at date 1. It is assumed that running away is costly and that bankers must in this case sacri ce a fraction of every diverted good. 4 I model this by assuming that the net return of cash diversion per unit of cash diverted is equal to , with This net return is lower than the return from storage in the absence of diversion, and the overall return from diversion is (1 + ) -the key assumption here is that the gain from diversion increases with leverage, not that it is proportional. Following Mendoza et al. (2009) , I will interpret parameter as an indicator of the degree of enforcement of nancial contracts and, therefore, as an indicator of nancial development of the economy (this point will be discussed in more details in section 3). 5 The lower , the more costly to divert funds ( & 0 corresponds to the absence of moral hazard). As it will become clear in a moment, diversion is a simple and 3 Gerardi et al. (2010) show empirical evidence of loan mis-selling in the US prior to the recent nancial crisis. In the present setup, however, cash diversion will only act as an out-of-equilibrium threat and shall never materialize itself in equilibrium. 4 The moral hazard problem could also be viewed as coming from bankers' incapacity to commit not to stopping entrepreneurs' projects (or rolling over entrepreneurs' loans) between dates 0 and 1, liquidating the assets, and running away with the proceeds of liquidation. In this case 1 could then alternatively be interpreted as the cost of liquidating early entrepreneurs' assets.
5 As the recent crisis taught us, one might argue that moral hazard issues are also prevalent (i.e. that is also big) in mature economies. Here, I follow Mendoza et al. (2009) 's interpretation, with the idea that despite the moral hazard problems that arise from nancial innovation in developed countries (e.g. securitization, OTC markets, etc.), moral hazard is still overall less important in these countries than in emerging market economies.
useful shortcut to introduce a limited borrowing capacity, as it implies that to raise funds bankers must have enough skin in the game and limit their leverage.
Asymmetric Information. There is an asymmetry of information between borrowers and lenders in the sense that the s are privately known. Lenders do not observe borrowers' skills and do not know every borrower's incentive to divert cash. Since skillful bankers are unable to distinguish themselves as skillful, they are also unable to commit themselves to behave better than unskilled borrowers. Indeed, if lenders were to naïvely accept to lend on the basis of borrowers' announced skills and tolerated a higher leverage for more skillful borrowers, 6 then all borrowers would claim being skillful and obtain large loans. Obviously no lender is willing to lend so much since in this case borrowers would divert the funds. Moreover, it is easy to see that borrowers' objective function (see relation (1) for = ) does not satisfy the single-crossing property, which would otherwise make it possible for borrowers to truthfully reveal their types through an appropriate menu of contracts. 7 Indeed, assume that borrowers face a menu of contracts { (e ) (e )} that stipulates the interest rate and the maximal leverage allowed for borrowers claiming e . Since from borrower 's perspective what matters for the choice of the contract is the rent on leverage (e ) ( (e )) (see expression (1)), and since this rent is independent of , borrower would always pick the contract that yields the highest rent. In e ect, this contract would be the unique (non-revealing) loan contract remaining on the market. It follows that the only loan contract ( ) signed in equilibrium is identical for all borrowers. Given the market rate (and return ), borrowers all demand the same loan . Borrower 's optimization problem therefore consists in maximizing his expected pro t (see expression (1) for = ) with respect to leverage under the constraint that the expected return on retail loan is above the expected return on wholesale loan (participation constraint), and under the constraint that he can credibly commit himself not to divert the funds (incentive compatibility constraint). 6 It is easy to show that in the symmetric information equilibrium borrowers' leverage increases with -see appendix 7.1.3. 7 A menu of contracts could be revealing if, for example, for a given increase in the borrowing rate, skillful borrowers were willing to accept a relatively lower increase in leverage than less skillful borrowers. That is, if the marginal rate of substitution between and at any given ( ) pair, ( ) = , decreased with . Since in this case skillful borrowers would value leverage relatively more (at the margin) than unskilled borrowers, it would be possible to design a menu of contracts that associates higher borrowing rates with higher leverage in such a way that skillful borrowers would reveal themselves by picking the high rate contract (in such contracts, leverage would typically be a concave function of the borrowing rate). However, from expression (1) one can see that the marginal rate of substitution between and is independent of : ( ) = = ( ). Hence, borrowers' objective function does not satisfy the single-crossing property.
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Date 0: 1. Given , banker decides whether he stores, lends ( = ) or borrows ( = ) 2. Borrower demands and lenders decide whether they lend to 3. Loan contracts are signed once aggregate supply equals aggregate demand 4. The interbank market closes, retail loan markets open, and borrower decides whether or not he goes to his retail loan market or diverts the funds Date 1: 1. If he did not divert, borrower gets net return (1 + ) with probability , and nothing otherwise. If he diverted he gets (1 + ) 2. Each lender on the wholesale market gets as return Table 1 : Time line Before I explicit borrower 's participation and incentive compatibility constraints, one comment is in order regarding the interpretation of agents as "bankers". Here agents do not perform any of the speci c tasks that would justify an interpretation in terms of "traditional" commercial banking, whereby bankers are intermediaries between depositors and borrowers. For example, they provide no payment services, perform no asset transformation, there is no delegated monitoring, etc. To the extent that they borrow and lend to each other on a wholesale nancial market agents should rather be viewed as "market-based" intermediaries, like broker-dealers or investment bankers. This interpretation has no material implication for the model, however, and one could also view the agents as other non-bank nancial rms, large non-nancial rms, or any other type of levered investors who have speci c investment opportunities on the one hand, and raise funds through the nancial market on the other hand. 8
Participation and Incentive Compatibility Constraints
Since technology and pro t are linear, it is easy to see that a banker either borrows or lends, but never does both. When he lends it is optimal for him to lend his entire initial wealth, in which case he gets return . It is easy to see from (1) that banker borrows ( = ) if
8 From a mechanism design perspective deposit based banks may arise endogenously as part of an e cient arrangement. Typically, as coalitions of agents banks are able to provide insurance against liquidity shocks (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), or share information (Boyd and Prescott,1986 ). More recently, Mattesini et al. (2010) rationalized the existence of banks by the presence of commitment issues rather than informational frictions. The focus of the present paper is di erent. First, I do not seek to explain why deposit based banks exist and, moreover, in the present setup potential coalitions between bankers into larger and perfectly diversi ed nancial institutions would be ruled out by the moral hazard problem. Second, I am primarily interested in market-based banks because of their increasing importance in the economy and central role in the recent crisis, as Adrian and Shin (2008b) have documented: "broker-dealers have traditionally played market-making and underwriting roles in securities market. However, their importance in the supply of credit has increased dramatically in recent years with the (...) changing nature of the nancial system toward one based on capital market, rather than one based on the traditional role of the bank as intermediating between depositors and borrowers." (p. 1).
and lends ( = ) otherwise. Constraint (PC) is thus borrower 's participation constraint. Since bankers whose satis es
borrow funds, the expected return from the loans to the pool of borrowers is by de nition equal to
This relation means that the risk premium is the inverse of the average repayment probability of the pool of borrowers, (1 + ) 2. Although lenders do not observe the type of each borrower, they are able to infer the type of the marginal borrower based on the market return and the market rate . No banker will be willing to lend if there exist borrowers > whose return from cash diversion (1 + ) is above both the expected return on retail lending and above the return on nancial assets. Borrower knows of this in advance, and so takes care never demand too high a loan , such that
The above constraint can be interpreted in two di erent ways, re ecting bankers' trade-o s between cash diversion and retail lending on the one hand, and between cash diversion and wholesale lending on the other hand. It can be seen as borrowers' incentive compatibility constraint ( (1 + ) 6 ( + ( ))), but also as lenders' incentive compatibility constraint ( (1 + ) 6 ), to the extent that lenders too could potentially borrow and divert funds. By construction, the two terms inside the max operator are identical (see relation (2)). Constraint (IC) is at the core of the present model. It requires that leverage be incentive compatible for all borrowers, including the marginal one, and therefore guarantees that all borrowers have the incentive to use the funds borrowed for retail lending. This may seem extreme at rst sight (indeed, this rules out cross-subsidization between borrowers, whereby virtuous borrowers would pay a higher cost of funding to compensate for the losses on peccant borrowers) but it is a necessary condition for the market to clear. To understand this point, consider for a moment a situation where lenders would accept to lend to over-levered borrowers (so that constraint (IC) does not hold). Then one would have (1 + ) , which means that bankers would be better o borrowing and diverting the cash rather than lending to other bankers. In this case, however, there would be no supply of funds on the wholesale market, which contradicts the fact that some bankers lend in the rst place. Such situation cannot be an equilibrium. Now assume that at the market rate all lenders accept to lend only to borrowers whose leverage satis es constraint (IC), except one deviating lender, who tolerates a higher leverage. In this case, all bankers would demand a loan to this deviating lender, who would then be exposed to cash diversion, face a lower repayment probability and, ultimately, obtain a lower expected return. In particular, because some borrowers would divert cash, the average repayment probability of the pool of borrowers would be less than 1 2 and the lender's expected return less than 2, which is below the equilibrium market return (see relation (3)). It follows that in equilibrium no lender has interest in granting a loan that violates constraint (IC). 9 The program of banker consists in maximizing his expected pro t with respect to and -see (1)-under the incentive compatibility constraint (IC). I am now ready to de ne an equilibrium:
De nition 1 (Equilibrium): An equilibrium of the wholesale nancial market is a couple ( ) for the expected market return and leverage such that (i) is optimal given and (ii) the wholesale nancial market clears.
I solve the equilibrium in three steps. First, I derive the optimal leverage that maximizes borrower 's expected pro t under constraint (IC) and determine the type of the marginal borrower . This permits me to derive the aggregate supply and demand curves (second step), and eventually to solve for the equilibrium (third step).
Optimal Leverage and Marginal Borrower
Since it is optimal for the borrowers to demand as big a loan as possible, the incentive compatibility constraint binds and one has
The positive relationship between and is an important feature of the present model but at odds with standard asymmetric information models, like Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 's, which predicts on the contrary that borrowing constraints should be more stringent when the market return goes up. Two important di erences with this type of models are worth mentioning. First, in these models lenders usually have market power, whereas here the wholesale market is competitive and bankers are price takers. Second, in Stiglitz and Weiss credit rationing is due to the adverse selection of borrowers and the fact that the identity of the lenders and borrowers is xed exogenously. In the present model there is no adverse selection, and bankers choose on which side of the market they operate. This choice depends on the return on nancial assets. When decreases, for example, the net present value of retail loans increases and turns positive for the lenders with the highest s. As a result, these bankers shift from the supply to the demand side of the wholesale nancial market and become borrowers: goes down. The drop in has two distinct implications. First, new borrowers are less e cient than the borrowers already present in the market and therefore the average repayment probability diminishes. This contrasts with adverse selection models where a decrease in would on the contrary work to improve the average quality of borrowers. (These models assume in general a mean preserving spread distribution of returns -or a similar mechanism, which makes the safest borrowers leave the market when the interest rate increases.) Second, the drop in also implies that the marginal borrower's incentive to divert cash increases, which arouses lenders' fear of diversion. Understanding lenders' increasing fear borrowers reduce their leverage in order to access the market: each of them demands a loan such that even the least e cient, marginal, borrower can commit himself not to run away. Hence the positive relationship between and . Overall, this positive relationship results from the joint e ects of moral hazard and asymmetric information. Because of the moral hazard problem lenders put a cap on borrowers' leverage. Because of the asymmetry of information the marginal borrower exerts a negative externality on the whole pool of borrowers. Indeed, not only does his incentive compatibility constraint determine his own leverage, but it also determines the leverage of all the other borrowers. (To see this point, compare constraint (IC) with the incentive compatibility constraint (A3) -in appendix 7.1.3-that would prevail in a symmetric information world.) Since the marginal borrower's tolerated leverage increases with the marginal borrower's skills, leverage goes down whenever new, less e cient bankers enter the demand side of the market or, in other words, when decreases ( 0). This leverage e ect decreases the aggregate demand for funds when market return goes down and is responsible for the hump shaped form of the aggregate demand curve (see gure 1). It is useful for the determination of aggregate demand and supply to express as a function of . Substituting and out of relations (2), (3), and (4), one can characterize the marginal borrower as follows (see appendix 7.2):
with 0 ( ) 0, which means that the number of lenders increases as market return goes up.
Given , an increase in increases the opportunity cost of investing into nancial assets, and so reduces the number of lenders 0. A rise in has the opposite e ect. By raising the incentive to divert cash, it triggers deleveraging, lowers the overall return on retail loans, and raises the opportunity cost of borrowing; hence the rise in the number of lenders ( 0).
Aggregate Funds Supply and Demand
I am now in the position to derive the aggregate supply and demand curves. When 1, bankers prefer storage over wholesale lending and there no supply of funds in this case. When
(1 ] bankers 6 become lenders and aggregate supply is then equal to . When = 1 bankers 6 are indi erent between storage and wholesale lending, so that aggregate supply is undetermined (but below ). Finally, when all bankers supply funds, meaning that aggregate supply is equal to 1. Hence, aggregate supply ( ) takes the following form:
On the demand side, when [1 ] bankers > become borrowers and borrow , so that aggregate demand equals (1 ) . When 1, the opportunity cost of borrowing is the return 10 It is easy to check that ( ) 2 + (2 ) 2 + 4 (2 ).
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on storage: aggregate demand is constant and the same as when = 1. Finally, when no banker wants to be a borrower, and aggregate demand is null. Aggregate demand ( ) can therefore be expressed as
Aggregate demand ( ) is driven by two opposite e ects. On the one hand, all things being equal, a rise in works to decrease the number of borrowers and, therefore, aggregate demand for funds ( 0 ( ) 0). This can be seen as an "extensive margin" e ect. On the other hand, it works to increase leverage per head ( 0). This can be seen as an "intensive margin" e ect.
These two e ects result in the aggregate demand curve being strictly concave and, potentially, hump-shaped over interval (1 ): 0 ( ) = 0 ( ) ( ) 0 and (for large enough) 0 (1 + ) 0. The fact that aggregate demand may reach a maximum for some market return 1 (see gure 1) means that borrowers may be unable to absorb the whole supply of funds whenever it is too high. The hump shape re ects the notion that there is a limit to the banking sector's ability to re-allocate liquidity internally. It also re ects the negative externality that the marginal borrower imposes on the other borrowers when it enters the demand side of the market. Which one of the extensive and intensive margin e ects prevails depends on the prominence of this externality, which is more severe when it a ects many borrowers, i.e. when and are low. It follows that aggregate demand increases (decreases) with for low (high) values of . In addition, since 0, it is easy to see that ( ) > 0 and ( ) 6 0. As the incentive to divert cash increases (higher ) bankers' borrowing capacity diminishes and the retail lending activity becomes less attractive with respect to nancial assets. In this case the supply 11 Indeed, one has 0 ( ) 0, 00 ( ) 0, and 00 ( ) = 00 ( ) ( ) 2 0 ( ) . Hence, 00 ( ) 0. Moreover, from (7) one gets:
When % 1 the left-hand side of the inequality goes to zero, while the right-hand side is strictly positive (from (5)). In other terms the aggregate demand curve is hump shaped when the moral hazard problem is not too benign.
curve shifts upward and the demand curve shifts downward. An increase in has the opposite e ect by making retail lending more attractive relative to nancial assets: ( ) 6 0 and ( ) > 0. Given the above aggregate demand and supply, the market clearing condition, which determines , reads ( ) = ( )
Equilibrium
The aggregate supply and demand curves are represented in gure 1, for a case where the moral hazard problem on the nancial market is neither too severe nor too benign (i.e. when productivity is neither too high nor too low and is above a certain threshold -see proposition 1 and relation (A10) in appendix 7.3) and multiple equilibria coexist. Those are represented by points , , and +. It is easy to see that only equilibria and + are locally tatonnement stable, in the sense that any small perturbation to the equilibrium price would bring the price back to equilibrium as a result of a standard Walrasian tatonnement process. 12 In contrast, equilibrium associated with expected return is unstable and is, as such, of limited relevance; I will not discuss this equilibrium further in the paper. Which equilibrium is ultimately reached depends on bankers' beliefs about the odds that borrowers run away. Since in this paper I am only interested in the conditions of coexistence of multiple equilibria and not in which equilibrium is ultimately selected when and + coexist, I will not address the issue of equilibrium selection here. Proposition 1 below describes the conditions of existence and uniqueness of equilibria and +.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium): There exist a threshold (with 0 1) and functions b ( ) Proof: See appendix 7.3.
The threshold b ( ) in proposition 1 corresponds to the minimum level of productivity that is necessary to reach +. Condition b ( ) alone is not su cient to guarantee that the economy will reach this equilibrium because may also exist when
, in which case the wholesale market is subject to coordination failures. To see this point, suppose 12 See Mas-Colell et al., 1995, section 17H. 13 For the value of and the explicit forms of functions ( ) and ( ) see expressions (A10), (A8), and (A9) in appendix 7.3.
14 Replacing (5) into (6), and (7), one gets (for
, with = ( ).
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for a moment that all bankers are pessimistic, in the sense that everyone believes that even unskilled borrowers (who are prone to diversion) demand funds. To protect themselves against cash diversion lenders will tolerate only low leverage, implying -all things being equal-a low aggregate demand and a low equilibrium market return, so that even unskilled borrowers will indeed be willing to demand funds (thereby validating bankers' initial beliefs). The economy will reach (see gure 1), which I will refer to as the "crisis time" equilibrium. This situation is akin to a market run, where every lender who believes that other lenders tolerate low leverage will also tolerate low leverage. In contrast, if all bankers are optimistic about counterparty risk, then the market return will be high ( + 1) and justify, ex post, bankers' optimism. The economy will then reach +, which I will refer to as the "normal time" equilibrium. Both equilibria and + are consistent and compatible with a given productivity level
. Note however that + and never co-exist when the moral hazard problem is benign, i.e. when , since b ( ) = ( ) in this case, and that + always exists and is unique when = 0 (see the discussion and gure A3 in appendix 7.3). Figure 2 completes the description of the possible equilibria. Here productivity varies from = 2 to = 3. High productivity = 3 generates a relatively high demand for funds with respect to the total amount of liquidity available in the economy (here normalized to one) and results in a relatively high equilibrium market return, which crowds ine cient borrowers out of the demand side of the market. Since the remaining borrowers have little incentive to divert cash, they do not need to be disciplined through stringent limits on leverage. In this case the equilibrium is characterized by high market return + , high leverage + , and an e cient nancial market. There is no crisis. This contrasts with the case = 2, where in equilibrium hardly any funds are channeled to skillful bankers. Equilibrium features a high risk premium, deleveraging, and liquidity hoarding. At the market return = 1 the total quantity of funds available is (1 + ) but lenders are indi erent between nancial assets and storage. Moreover, at this market return the incentive to divert cash is so high that lenders do not tolerate a leverage above = (1 ) , for a higher leverage would not be incentive compatible. Because at this market return the constrained aggregate demand is lower than aggregate supply, not all funds are channelled to the wholesale nancial market (and ultimately to entrepreneurs). The quantity of funds that is not invested,
, is stored until date 1. 15 In other terms, bankers hoard liquidity. 16 In this equilibrium an exogenous increase in the aggregate supply of liquidity would have no e ect on the equilibrium market return and on the real economy. The crisis equilibrium thus presents features akin to the traditional Keynesian liquidity trap. Moreover, the nancial system is subject to two types of ine ciencies. First, a fraction of the total liquidity available in the economy is kept idle within the banking sector. Second, retail loans also reach low entrepreneurs, whose expected productivity is lower than that of the entrepreneurs who would otherwise be nanced during normal times (see proposition 2iv below). In the rest of the paper I will refer to the existence of the crisis equilibrium as " nancial fragility" (de nition 3). Section 4.2 will discuss how policy interventions may help avoid such undesirable outcome.
De nition 3 (Financial Fragility): The wholesale nancial market is fragile whenever the crisis time equilibrium exists, i.e. whenever 6 ( ). 17
As proposition 1 suggests, the threshold ( ) is an increasing function of . This means that when the retail loan market is less developed then real productivity must be higher to rule out crises. This productivity threshold corresponds to the very productivity level for which exists but there is no liquidity hoarding, that is (1 + ) = (1), and can be obtained by solving this latter equation numerically (see also relation (A8) in appendix 7.3). Proposition 2 compares the crisis time and the normal time equilibria. In normal times the expected market return on nancial assets is relatively high, unskilled bankers prefer to lend rather than borrow so that the pool of borrowers is composed of e cient bankers only. This has two consequences in terms of funding liquidity and credit risks. First, borrowers are able to raise a large amount of funds (proposition 2i), which results in high aggregate demand and a high equilibrium market rate . The implied narrowing of the spread re ects bankers' ability to borrow against the present value of retail loans or, in Brunnermeier (2009)'s 15 By de nition of ( ), ( ) (1 + ) (1), which means that = 1 clears the wholesale market. 16 Storage is crucial in the present model. The assumption that there exists a storage technology is a simple way to introduce liquidity hoarding. Another, equally important, implication is that without storage bankers would not be able to divert liquidity in the rst place and the economy would always reach the First Best equilibrium -see the analyzes of the benchmark economies in appendices 7.1.1 and 7.1.2. 17 To my knowledge there is no universal de nition of the notion of " nancial fragility". This de nition somewhat di ers from -but is not inconsistent with-Allen and Gale (2005)'s, who de ne nancial fragility as a situation where a "small aggregate shock in the demand for liquidity leads to disproportionately large e ects in terms of default or asset-price volatility " (p. 543).
language, the degree of funding liquidity. 18 Put di erently, the spread can be viewed as a funding liquidity risk premium. Driven by lenders' fear that borrowers divert the cash, this premium is lower in normal times (proposition 2iii) when only skillful bankers raise funds (i.e. when is high -see appendix (7.4) for a formal proof). Second, a high expected market return on nancial assets has also a negative e ect on credit risk since, conditional on not diverting, borrowers are less likely to default. Hence the credit risk premium too is lower in + than in (proposition 2ii). Overall, the interest rate spread on retail loans is the (geometric) sum of a credit risk premium , due to the risk that entrepreneurs default, and a funding liquidity risk premium , due to the risk that borrowers divert the funds. Note that in the literature more is known about the relationship between nancial market depth and market liquidity -i.e., the ease with which assets are traded, than about the relationship between market depth and funding liquidity. Pagano (1986) , for example, develops a model where market liquidity is positively related to the size of the nancial market and "trading volume and absorptive capacity of the market tend to feed positively on each other: more traders make more active trade, and vice versa" (p. 256). In contrast, as in Bebchuck and Goldstein (2010) , proposition 2 suggests there is a positive correlation between the volume of trade (point i) and funding liquidity (point iii) since both increase from crisis to normal times. I complete the description of the equilibrium with the comparative statics analysis of variations in the two parameters of the model and (see proposition 3).
Proposition 3 (E ects of Productivity and Diversion Cost):
(i) In +:
Proof: See appendix 7.5.
As the partial derivatives of (5) with respect to and suggest, an increase in has two opposite e ects on + . On the one hand, given higher returns on retail loans attract bankers to the demand side of the interbank market ( 0). On the other hand, the rise in also relaxes the borrowing constraint (see (IC)), which generates a higher demand for fund per borrower ( + increases), a higher aggregate demand, a higher equilibrium market return ( + goes up), and works to reduce the number of borrowers ( 0). Proposition 3i shows that this second e ect prevails (i.e.
+ ultimately goes up) and that in normal times a rise in implies fewer but more leveraged borrowers on the interbank market (proposition 3i). (I.e. it improves the e ciency of the banking sector). The intuition is that the least e cient borrowers ultimately prefer to become lenders in order to reap bene ts from the most e cient bankers' productivity gains. The e ect of on + is subject to a similar, albeit opposite, trade-o .
Given , a higher increases borrowers' incentive to divert funds and diminishes lenders' leverage tolerance ( + goes down), which by reducing the return on retail loans also reduces the number of borrowers ( 0). As the aggregate demand for funds diminishes, however, so does + , which works to reduce the number of lenders. Again, this latter e ect dominates and ultimately + goes down. In crisis times, in contrast, the market only adjusts through bankers' liquidity hoarding behavior, not through market return, which is constant (proposition 3ii). Hence the above trade-o does not exist and only the direct e ects of and on borrowers' incentives are at work. It follows that increases in and have negative and positive e ects on , respectively (proposition 3ii).
Financial Integration, Imbalances, and Fragility
As sections 2.3 and 2.4 suggest the model ultimately boils down to a familiar supply and demand nexus. What makes this nexus non standard is the peculiar form of the fund demand curve, which nancial frictions constrain and distort into a hump shape. (In appendix 7.1.3 I show that the demand curve would be monotonically decreasing in the market return in the absence of asymmetric information.) From a graphical perspective, the robustness of the nancial system depends on where the supply curve stands with respect to the demand curve (see gure 2). Any exogenous upward shift in the supply curve makes the nancial system closer to fragility. As many policy makers and academics (e.g. Bernanke, 2005 have pointed out, one important cause of excess liquidity in developed countries (notably the US) in the run up to the recent crisis was the global saving glut and incapacity of the domestic banking sectors in emerging market economies (notably Asia excluding Japan) to generate nancial assets from domestic real investments, as well as their propensity to instead invest domestic savings into developed countries' nancial assets. The purpose of this section is to model this phenomenon as an upward shift in the fund supply curve on the interbank market. To do so I now consider a twocountry (or -region) model. The two countries have the same features as the economy described so far: each of them is populated with a continuum of bankers, entrepreneurs, and islands, has the same productivity and storage technology, etc. However, following Mendoza et al. (2009) , I assume that one country is assumed nancially "developed", with = , while the other is "emerging", with = and > . This latter inequality means that nancial contracts are harder to enforce and bankers have greater incentives to divert funds in the emerging country than in the developed country. This is the only feature that di erentiates the two countries, which I index by = (for "emerging"), (for "developed"). The country of origin of a given banker is perfectly observable. I rst described in section 3.1 the current account imbalances that arise following the nancial integration of the two countries. In section 3.2 I discuss the conditions under which these imbalances generate nancial fragility, and in section 3.3 I discuss the implications of nancial integration in terms of output and welfare.
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Current Account Imbalances
In autarky, bankers located in country trade with each other through country 's domestic wholesale nancial market. There are two distinct interbank markets, and for each of them the equilibrium is characterized as in proposition 1, for = . From propositions 2 and 3, one can see that in normal times the interbank market of country is characterized by a higher expected return ( + > + ) as well as fewer but more leveraged borrowers ( + + and + + ). After nancial integration bankers from the two countries trade with each other through the international wholesale nancial market. Because the international fund demand (supply) is equal to the sum of the domestic demands (supplies), it is easy to see that it too is hump shaped (monotonically increasing). Figure 3 illustrates this point, for a case where in autarky domestic nancial markets would be very thin in (equilibrium ) and deep in (equilibrium +), and and + are unique. Following nancial integration clears the integrated market
where the aggregate supply and demand of funds by bankers in country , ( ) and ( ), are de ned in (6) and (7) for = . In equilibrium, the excess supply of funds from country exactly o sets the excess demand in country , which then runs current account de cit. Capital ows freely across countries and typically goes from the country with the lowest market return ( ) to the country with the higher market return ( ). 19 The question I am interested in is whether the nancial integration of can be detrimental to . 19 Because there may be multiple equilibria, this may not always be the case for some very speci c con gurations.
For example, one could imagine that in autarky both and + co-exist in the two countries and that country coordinates on +, whereas country coordinates on . In such a case and + would still co-exist after nancial integration, but which equilibrium the international market ultimately coordinates on would depend on which country changes beliefs. In particular, if the integrated market coordinates on +, then capital will end up owing from to , although the market return was initially the lowest in country . Another situation could be one where domestic banking sectors are under-developed in both countries so that is the only possible autarkic equilibrium and market returns equal one. In this case, nancial integration would have no implication on the worldwide allocation of savings. For the analysis of the recent nancial crisis these extreme examples are of limited interest. For this reason I focus my attention on the e ects of nancial integration when the developed economy's domestic nancial sector is initially not fragile, i.e. when + is the unique autarkic equilibrium. The answer to this question depends on whether country has enough prime investment opportunities to absorb the excess supply of liquidity from country . Figure 3 shows that this is not always the case: may emerge after nancial integration when capital in ows are too large. In fact, country can only run a limited current account de cit beyond which its banking sector becomes fragile. The reason is that a larger share of liquidity is channelled to lower grade investments when more liquidity ows in, which feeds counter-party fears and may trigger a market run. Figure 4 illustrates this point by showing the current account balance of country in percentage of country 's domestic output for various values of (see section 3.3 below for the de nition of output). It decreases with in + (plain line curve), is constant in (dashed horizontal line), and is surjective when both and + coexist. In normal times, the current account de cit widens as increases because the incentives to divert funds are stronger and counterparty risks higher in this case, which leads lenders from country to further invest into country . Borrowers in country are also able to raise more funds than those in country ( -see relation (4)). As a result, the rent on leverage is higher in country and, all things being equal (in particular given that the productivity level and market return are the same in both countries), there are more borrowers in this country than in country ( -see relation (5)). As goes up, the ow of funds from to intensi es and leverage in country 's banking sector as a whole increases. More precisely, leverage decreases at the bank level (i.e. goes down) but increases at the banking sector's level (i.e. (1 ) goes up), which is consistent with feature 1 in the Introduction. Given country 's limited absorptive capacity, however, it may be that nancial integration makes the international nancial system more fragile. As gure 4 shows, there is indeed a threshold for (represented by the dotted vertical line) above which capital in ows 21 are so large that even ine cient bankers may enter the demand side of the nancial market. If lenders believe that risky bankers are on the other side of the market, then they may run o the market and trigger a crisis. During a crisis international trade collapse and country 's de cit is smaller than in normal times due to bankers hoarding liquidity. (In percentage of country 's output, the current account de cit may be larger in the crisis time equilibrium for some low since output is also lower in this case -gure 6a illustrates this latter point.) In e ect, the developed economy is only able to cope with a limited current account de cit without any threat to the nancial sector (see de nition 4 below). For example, for = 3 this limit is at about 1.4% of country 's GDP, which corresponds to the intersection of the plain line curve with the vertical dotted line in gure 4. Any increase in the current account de cit above this capacity gives rise to multiple equilibria with the possibility of coordination failures onto the crisis time equilibrium. The relationship between nancial integration and nancial fragility is discussed in more details next section. Figure 5 reports the minimum level of productivity ( ) that is required to rule out the nancial crisis equilibrium for various degrees of nancial development in the emerging country, with > , in autarky and under nancial integration. The lower dotted line corresponds to the productivity threshold for the developed country in autarky when = 0 7. It is constant because in autarky the wholesale nancial market of country is independent of . The upper dotted line corresponds to the productivity threshold ( ) for the emerging country in autarky for various values of above 0 7. It increases monotonically with (from proposition 1, 0 ( ) 0). It is easy to see that the emerging (developed) country in autarky has the most (least) fragile nancial system. Finally, the plain line curve in the middle corresponds to the productivity threshold ( ) after nancial integration. It is computed in a similar way as in the previous section and obtained by solving equation (1 + ) + (1 + ) = (1) + (1) numerically with respect to . All thresholds are identical when = = 0 7 for in this case nancial integration does not imply any net capital ow or imbalance across countries. In other terms, the nancial integration of equally developed countries has no e ect on nancial fragility. In the present model, nancial integration only matters when it involves countries with di erent degrees of development. 20 As they ow to country , country 's savings exert downward pressures on the wholesale market expected return, which is conducive to market runs. Financial integration raises the minimum productivity level required in country to rule out such runs and, given , makes country 's nancial sector more fragile. This result is illustrated by the fact that the plain line curve increases with respect to (i.e. One important conclusion of this section is therefore that nancial integration of emerging countries jeopardizes the nancial system if the degree of nancial development of these countries is too low given the level of productivity in the real sector. Based on gures 3 and 4 one can therefore de ne a country's absorptive capacity as follows:
Financial Fragility
De nition 4 (Absorptive Capacity): The absorptive capacity of country is the maximal quantity of savings, 1 + ( ) ( ), that country 's banking sector can process and channel to the real sector in equilibrium without the nancial market becoming fragile, where is the equilibrium market rate that prevails when & ( ).
In the two countries the liquidity absorption capacity decreases with ( ). An absorptive capacity above one (i.e. above domestic savings) means that the country's nancial sector is able to channel funds above and beyond domestic savings to the domestic real sector without being subject to runs. The nancial sector's limited absorptive capacity has some important implications in terms of output and welfare, which I discuss next section.
Aggregate Output and Welfare
Since entrepreneurs do not make any pro t welfare in country ( ) is de ned as the sum of bankers' net gains (as de ned in (1))
Aggregate output ( ) is de ned as the sum of entrepreneurs' output
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Welfare and output for various degrees of nancial development are reported in gure 6. The plain lines correspond to full nancial integration and the dotted lines correspond to autarky. The model is parameterized so that the nancial system is not fragile in country in autarky, i.e.
does not exist. (I use = 3, = 0 7 and > 0 7.) In this case, country has unique and constant levels of output and welfare. In country , in contrast, equilibrium + is unique only for low values of , does not exist for values of close to one, and coexists with for intermediate values of . In all cases, welfare and output are lower, and the nancial system is more fragile in country than in country . Financial integration has two main e ects. First, as discussed in the previous section, since the emerging country may export nancial fragility to the developed country, nancial integration reduces world aggregate welfare and output in the case a nancial crisis materializes. Second, in normal times nancial integration raises both output and welfare at the world level because resources are overall more e ciently used. However, it also induces a redistribution of wealth and welfare both within and across countries. Typically, output augments in the developed country thanks to higher investments but diminishes in the emerging country ( gures 6a and 6b). Perhaps more surprising is the result that welfare is redistributed the other way around ( gures 6c and 6d). The change in the equilibrium interest rate is detrimental to borrowers and bene cial to lenders in the emerging country (where the interest rate increases), whereas it is detrimental to lenders and bene cial to borrowers in the developed country (where the interest rate decreases). In the emerging country, welfare tends to diminish because of borrowers' welfare losses, but these losses are more than o set (i) by the welfare gains induced by the relaxation of borrowers' borrowing constraint (i.e. the rise in ), (ii) by lenders' welfare gains (rise in ), and (iii) by the fact that the proportion of lenders ( ) increases. Thus, overall domestic welfare increases ( gure 6d). Symmetrically, in the developed country lenders are worse o and the tightening of the borrowing constraint (decrease in ) partially o sets borrowers' net gains from the lower borrowing rate. Moreover, a disproportionate share of the output gains generated in country ultimately accrue to the lenders from country , so that overall welfare diminishes ( gure 6c). Financial liberalization thus bene ts to the emerging country and is detrimental to the developed country. These predictions are opposite to Ju and Wei (2010) and Mendoza et al. (2007) . The latter present a model where welfare redistribution e ects induced by the change in the interest rate are much stronger than the wealth e ects. The reason is that in their setup agents have concave utility and the borrowers are the poorest agents (i.e. with the highest marginal utility of consumption), who want to borrow in order to smooth their consumption. In this context, in the emerging country the redistribution from borrowers to lenders reduces domestic welfare, while in the developed country the redistribution from lenders to borrowers increases it.
Discussion
The objective of this section is twofold. The rst objective is to discuss the empirical pertinence of my model and whether the model is able to match important features of nancial crises. Having established that the model matches the facts reasonably well, the second objective is to discuss the impact of policy interventions like capital controls or Basel III's liquidity coverage ratio requirement on nancial stability.
Model and Facts
In the model the run-up phase to a nancial crisis corresponds to normal times where imbalances build up and gradually erode the absorptive capacity of the economy. This is a situation where the economy is in +, with productivity ( ), but (i) productivity is slowing down (i.e. gradually goes down toward and below ), or (ii) less developed countries access the international nancial market (i.e. gradually goes up toward and above due to the rise in ), or (iii) contract enforceability in the developed country is slowly deteriorating. As the recent crisis illustrated, such deterioration can be due for example to the emergence of complex nancial products, increased opaqueness, and the development of securitization (i.e. gradually goes up toward and above due to the rise in ). 21 Moreover, in the model nancial crises materialize themselves as a sudden freezing of nancial markets, liquidity hoarding, abrupt deleveraging, and feedback e ects onto aggregate output and international trade. These model predictions all seem consistent with the way the recent crisis built up and broke out. Thus, although stylized, the model illustrates e ectively some important aspects of this crisis. The aim of this section is to 21 Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) provide a thorough account of the moral hazard problems that arise with securitization.
25 discuss the empirical relevance of the model as well as, more generally, which other features of nancial crises the model does -or does not-capture.
Liquidity Supply and Absorptive Capacity. The main prediction of the model is that nancial crises result from tensions between the abundance of liquidity and the capacity of the banking sector to process this liquidity. Is this prediction empirically pertinent? I address this question by testing whether the probability of a systemic banking crisis is both positively related to current account de cits and negatively related to labour productivity growth and contract enforceability. The basic idea is that in ows of foreign capital raise the supply of liquidity available to the domestic banking sector, while productivity growth and contract enforceability improve banks' ability to reallocate liquidity among themselves. This test is admittedly very coarse but the goal here is to get an idea of whether the model is relevant and not to provide an in-depth empirical analysis, as this would go too far beyond the scope of this paper. I estimate logistic models of the probability of a systemic crisis based on an annual panel data set for 25 OECD countries over the period 1987-2010. I work with mature economies owing to data availability but also to exclude currency crises from the sample and keep focusing on systemic banking crises. I use Laeven and Valencia (2008) 's list of systemic banking crises and complement it with Reinhart and Rogo (2008)'s (see appendix 7.6). The sample notably includes the Japanese and Scandinavian crises, the S&L crisis, and the 2007-2008 crisis. The current account and total labour productivity data are from the OECD, and the contract enforceability indicator is from the World Bank ("Doing Business" database). 22 The dependent variable ( ) is a dummy equal to one for country in year when a systemic banking crisis begins in country in year , and to zero otherwise. The independent variables include total labour productivity growth ( ), the current account surplus as a fraction of GDP ( ), and the indicator of contract enforceability ( ). This indicator is a country xed e ect equal to one if the cost of enforcing contracts in country in year 2004 (i.e. in the rst year when it is available) belongs to the bottom 30% of the sample distribution, and to zero otherwise. 23 That is, it is equal to one for the countries where contracts are the most enforceable. All independent variables are lagged by one year to alleviate potential endogeneity biases. Indeed, I am concerned with nancial crises having adverse e ects on productivity, which would biase downward the coe cient on productivity growth. The contention here is that productivity growth in year 1 is not caused by whether a systemic banking crisis will break out in year . For the results see column (1) in table 2 ; the t-stats in parentheses are adjusted for clustering. All coe cients are negative and signi cant at the 5% threshold, which means that the likelihood of a crisis is lower for countries with high labour productivity growth, where contracts are enforceable, and that run a current account surplus. These ndings essentially con rm the prediction of the theory. In column (2) I control for country xed e ects by adding countries' sample mean of , referred to as . As one would expect with this xed e ect becomes insigni cant, but the other results hold on. 2 49** (-19.67) 3 33** (-12.02) 3 48** (-9.81) 3 49** Table 2 : Logistic models of the probability of a systemic crisis (4)). The results hold on. Having established the relevance of productivity, contract enforceability, and capital in ows in the build up phase of the recent crisis, I now turn to the discussion on which other features of the recent and earlier crises the model is -or isn't-able to account for.
Bank Risk Taking. As gure 2 suggests, the build up phase of a crisis can be viewed as a gradual upward shift of the liquidity supply curve along the downward sloping part of the aggregate demand curve, implying an upward shift of equilibrium + along the demand curve. The build-up phase features a decrease in the equilibrium market rate and nancial deepening, which takes the form of a larger wholesale nancial market and higher leverage in the banking sector as a whole. (Note that although leverage is reduced at the bank level in order to preserve incentives, it increases at the banking sector level because more banks become leveraged.) As + decreases ine cient bankers enter the demand side ( + goes down, see proposition 3), more subprime 27 retail loans are nanced, and counterparty fears arise on the interbank market. This prediction is consistent with banks reallocating liquidity during the 2000s from productive and innovative sectors (e.g. information and communication technologies) toward mortgage lending and the construction sector (Dupont et al., 2011) . The switch of ine cient bankers from the supply to the demand side of the interbank market also captures anecdotal evidence that banks that used to be net lenders on the interbank market in the early 2000s, like the Spanish savings banks (cajas), became net borrowers as they engaged into mortgage lending. Hence, my model is also consistent with the well documented rise in bank risk taking prior to the 2007-2008 nancial crisis (see e.g. Jimenez et al., 2007) .
Zombie Lending, Liquidity Trap. The model is also consistent with 's explanation for the decade-long Japanese slowdown. Their explanation is based on the fact that most large Japanese banks kept lending to insolvent borrowers ("zombies") and that such zombie lending had -due to congestion e ects-negative externalities on healthiest non-zombie industries. To some extent this mechanism is present in my model, since in crisis times the entry of ine cient bankers on the demand side of the interbank market exerts a negative externality on the most e cient bankers, which are crowded out of the interbank market due to higher margin requirements. Moreover, the prediction of the model that during crises the economy is caught into a liquidity trap also o ers an explanation for Bank of Japan's incapacity to jump start economic growth through liquidity injections. 24
Market Returns, Spreads, Borrowing Rates. The prediction that riskless market returns ( ) should decrease and interest spreads ( and ) go up in a crisis (see propositions 1 and 2) is conform to observation. In the model, however, the increase in spreads is insu cient to o set the fall in the riskless market return, so that ultimately the interbank rate goes down during nancial crises ( + , see proposition 2). In other terms, the model falls short of explaining borrowing rates dynamics from normal to crisis times. To capture this aspect would require a richer analytical framework, with notably an endogenous retail loan rate . Indeed, the fall in the supply of funds on the retail loan market during nancial crises (due to liquidity hoarding) would then entail a rise in and drive up the other rates.
Policy Implications
This section discusses the e ects of three types of policy intervention capable of preserving nancial stability when liquidity is abundant. The rst policy is a monetary policy that consists of central banks providing a deposit facility and committing to remunerate deposits at a (real) rate . The second policy consists in controlling foreign capital in ows (e.g. through unremunerated reserves requirement). As will become clear in an instant, these two policies have fairly straight-forward implications. The third policy is a micro-prudential policy that consists in a nancial regulator requiring a minimum liquidity coverage ratio (LCR).
Central Bank Deposit Facility. Assume that the central banks of the two countries provide deposit facilities at the same deposit rate > 1. With this latter condition central bank deposits henceforth replace bankers' storage technology as outside option. It is easy to see from gure 1 that there exists a certain threshold for above which the crisis equilibrium is ruled out. Indeed, by remunerating deposits at a high enough rate, in fact for , (where is the smallest solution to (9)) the central bank makes sure that ine cient bankers are never willing raise funds on the interbank market. Put di erently, it is able to coordinate bankers' expectations onto the normal time equilibrium. Note that in equilibrium the central bank will not take any deposit, though, as all lenders will prefer to go to the wholesale market. It is therefore enough for the central bank to commit to remunerate deposits at rate in order to coordinate expectations and avoid nancial crises. Such policy, however, can only help when the moral hazard problem is not too severe and the normal time equilibrium exists, i.e. when b ( ). Interestingly, the above predictions of the model contradict Bebchuk and Goldstein (2010) 's. In their model a rise in the central bank deposit rate raises the opportunity cost of lending to entrepreneurs, which leads banks to exit the retail loan market and ultimately works to increase entrepreneurs' funding liquidity risks. Here, an increase in the central bank deposit rate also increases the opportunity cost of lending to entrepreneurs. However, as long as the deposit rate is not too high (i.e. for 6 + ), this has the virtuous e ect to limit zombie lending, to keep the least e cient bankers away from the demand side of the interbank market, and to mitigate counterparty fears. As a result, interest rate spikes reduce bankers' (and entrepreneurs') funding liquidity risks. Note however that there are limits to raising the deposit rate. In particular, it is easy to see that for ¡ + ¢ the interbank market would shrink and some bankers would deposit funds with the central banks, and that for > the interbank market would vanish.
Capital Controls. With the global economy beginning to emerge from the nancial crisis and lax monetary policies in mature economies capital has been owing back to emerging market economies. Capital mobility is in general a good thing for it allows, inter alia, high productivity countries to attract nancing for productive investments. However, the IMF recently expressed concerns that excessive foreign capital ows strain emerging market economies' absorptive capacity and admitted that, in some cases, controls of foreign capital in ows may help mitigate nancial vulnerabilities (IMF, 2011) . The present paper provides a rationale for such a policy. Capital in ows indeed create a low interest rate environment on domestic interbank markets, which is conducive to market runs. By ensuring that these ows do not exceed the country's absorptive capacity, capital controls may help prevent nancial crises and improve both aggregate output and welfare. Moreover, looser monetary policy in mature economies often entails looser monetary policy also in emerging economies (e.g. through foreign currency reserve accumulation). By lowering the real return on safe assets (i.e. in the model the return on storage) in ationary pressures may also be a factor of nancial vulnerability, which capital controls could 29 help mitigate.
Liquidity Coverage Ratio. The minimum LCR designed in Basel III identi es the amount of liquid assets a bank must hold that can be used to o set the net cash out ows it may encounter under stress. The most liquid assets include cash and marketable securities from sovereigns or central banks (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009). Retail loans and other banking book assets are considered as the most illiquid assets. The aim of the LCR is to ensure that the bank holds enough liquid assets to repay its short term wholesale debts and, more generally, short term nancing subject to funding liquidity risk. The main bene t of such a policy is to reduce funding liquidity risk and ensure that the bank is able to roll over its short term debt. The cost is that it diverts the bank from nancing the real sector and hinders entrepreneurs' investments. The present model lends itself particularly well to the analysis of this trade-o because it features both the assets and liabilities items Basel III's LCR is based on, namely: cash (i.e. storage) and wholesale debt that is subject to funding liquidity risk. Let
[0 1] be the minimum (liquidity coverage) ratio of cash to wholesale market debt bankers are required to hold, so that borrowers must store at least goods as cash if they want to raise on the wholesale market. This cash is assumed non-divertible, for example because it is escrowed with the central bank (e.g. reserves) or other third party. Hence a borrower's balance sheet at date 0 is structured as in To facilitate the discussion, parameter is assumed to be the same in the emerging as in the developed country. While the LCR reduces the quantity of funds that can be diverted, it is ine cient from the banker's viewpoint for it reduces the quantity of funds channelled to the real sector. It is therefore optimal to keep cash holding to the minimum and lend as much as possible, i.e. 1 + , to entrepreneurs. Banker thus maximizes his expected pro t
where 1 is the opportunity cost of holding cash. With probability retail loans are paid back and borrower 's net gain is the sum of returns on both retail loans and storage minus debt repayments. With probability 1 retail loans are not paid back and borrower 's gross return is that on storage, . Since 1 , the return on storage is insu cient to pay the entire debt and borrower gets nothing in net terms in this case. Note that because the banker must hold cash proportional to his wholesale market debt and cash holding is ine cient, the rent on leverage may not always cover the cost of wholesale debt. In particular, when is above ( )
the expected pro t decreases in , which implies that the interbank market does not exists.
Too high a liquidity coverage ratio kills the wholesale nancial market. For simplicity, in the analysis below I will derive the solution of maximization problem (12) under the conjecture that 6 ( ) ( 1) -bearing in mind that the solution shall hold only when this conjecture is true in equilibrium (this corresponds to situations (A) and (B) in gure 6 below). The model is solved in a similar way as the basic model. To keep notation simple, in what follows I drop the country indice = for country-speci c variables , , , domestic aggregate demand and supply ( ) and ( ), and parameter . Bankers' incentive compatibility constraint (IC) now
where, as before, the term on the left-hand side corresponds to the private bene t of the borrower when he misuses the funds (e.g. makes sub-prime retail loans). Banker is willing to borrow on the wholesale market if and only if
which implies the marginal borrower is
Since only bankers with > borrow funds the expected return from wholesale loans equals
From constraint (IC ) it is easy to check that -all things being equal-leverage is a positive function of :
This result simply restates that borrowers have less funds to misuse when they hold cash and that by mitigating the moral hazard problem LCR works to relax bankers' borrowing constraint. Notice also that the above relations are identical to relations (IC), (PC), (2), (3), and (4) when = 0, respectively. It is easy to re-arrange these equations in order to express as a function ( ), 25 and to derive aggregate supply and demand. Again, the equilibrium market return is the highest return that clears the interbank market, under the condition that ( )
in equilibrium. When this condition is not satis ed, then = 0 and there is no wholesale nancial market: bankers with 1 store their wealth, and all bankers with > 1 lend to their pool of entrepreneurs. I am now in the position to solve the model for various values of (0 1). The purpose of this exercise is to discuss the e ects of LCR on welfare and output in the developed country, as well as on the fragility of the international nancial system. To do so I start from a situation where in the absence of LCR ( = 0) both and + coexist and gradually raise up to one. I set parameters to = 3, = 0 7 and = 0 8. 31 from gures 4 and 5 that in this case and + coexist when = 0.) For the results see gure 6, which describes three di erent situations. Situation (A) is one where is too low to rule out nancial crises. In normal times, any marginal increase in the LCR reduces aggregate output as less funds are channelled to productive projects, without making the nancial system more robust. In crises times, the rise in LCR gradually reduces funding liquidity risk, which allows for an increase in leverage and the reduction of the excess supply of funds, hence the rise in output in this case. Figure 6 suggests that there exists a threshold for above which the moral hazard problem recedes and equilibrium is ruled out. This corresponds to situation (B). In this case the most e cient borrowers are able to leverage and demand enough funds so as to keep aggregate demand and market return high enough to maintain ine cient bankers on the supply side of the interbank market. Finally, situation (C) is one where borrowers are able to raise even more funds, but are unwilling to do so because they would then have to hold too much cash against wholesale debt, which is not pro table. That is, under the initial conjecture that borrowers demand as much funds as possible one would obtain ( ) ( 1) in equilibrium, which contradicts the initial conjecture. Hence, there is no wholesale nancial market in such case. Overall, this exercise suggests that there is an interval for the liquidity coverage ratio over which nancial crises are ruled out while market e ciency is preserved.
Conclusion
I developed an equilibrium model with causal relationships between nancial integration, current account imbalances, and nancial crises. Although stylized, the model is able to account for some important features of the recent crisis, like the reversal in leverage of market-based nancial institutions and the sudden collapse of nancial markets. Financial markets improve (in terms of e ciency) the allocation of liquidity (i.e. savings) within the banking sector, and from the banking sector to the real sector. However, frictions between lenders and borrowers impair their functioning and make them fragile. In the model, abundant liquidity exerts downward pressures on interest rates. Low interest rates are conducive to risk taking and the nancing of risky investments by banks, which feeds counterparty fears on the interbank market. In a context of asymmetric information, investors' beliefs about counterparty risks play a crucial role and may bring about two self-ful lling equilibria. The "normal time" equilibrium is characterized by a deep interbank market with low margin requirements, highly leveraged banks, and a large number of banks on the supply side of the market. The "crisis time" equilibrium is associated with high margin requirements, de-leveraging, liquidity hoarding, and a large number of banks on demand side. The run on the repo market in 2008 can be seen as a sudden change from the normal to the crisis time equilibrium, with banks suddenly switching from the supply to the demand side of the market. Financial crises occur only when there is too much liquidity given the existing set of prime investment opportunities, and when banks are led to lend to risky, low productivity, subprime borrowers. In e ect, the nancial market is shown to have a limited liquidity absorption capacity, which depends on the productivity of the real sector, the ultimate borrower. Extending the model to a two country framework, I present results in line with the recent literature that shows that the nancial integration of nancially under-developed countries is conducive to global imbalances. But I also go one step further by showing how and when such global imbalances make the international nancial system fragile. In normal times, nancial liberalization is found to increase welfare at the world level, but also to bene t to emerging countries and be detrimental to developed countries. Financial integration also makes nancial crises more likely when the degree of nancial development in the integrated emerging countries is too low and when capital ows toward developed countries are too large. The present paper also argues that one possible cause of the recent crisis is that the US productivity slowdown as of 2004 impaired US' absorptive capacity precisely when more foreign capital was owing in. It also shows that, when it materializes, a nancial crisis reduces welfare in all countries. Finally, I use the model to discuss the e ects of selected monetary and prudential policy interventions and capital controls. In particular, I discuss the pros and cons of Basel III's minimum liquidity coverage ratio, and show that there exists an interval for this ratio over which nancial crises are ruled out while the e ciency of the wholesale nancial market is preserved.
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Benchmark Models
In this section I describe the First Best equilibrium of the interbank market in the absence of friction, when the s are privately observed but cash diversion is not possible, and when cash diversion is possible but information is symmetric.
Frictionless Economy
Let be the marginal banker, who is indi erent between borrowing and lending with, by de nition: ( + ( )). Given , borrower ( > ) maximizes his expected pro t (1) with respect to , and it is optimal for him to demand an in nite quantity of funds ( + ) when . As a result, the aggregate demand for funds is nite if and only if = , which is therefore the condition for the nancial market to clear. At this rate, the most e cient banker = 1 is the only banker willing to borrow. Since this banker never defaults, = , and since 1 liquidity hoarding is never a viable option for bankers, who prefer to lend on the market.
In equilibrium there is no spread (i) between the interest rates on the retail and the bond markets ( = ) or (ii) between the interest rate and the return on nancial assets ( = ). This absence of spread re ects the full e ciency of the nancial market and in this cae the economy reaches the rst best equilibrium ( ( )) = ( 1). Note that this rst best corresponds to the equilibrium that would prevail in an economy where wealth would be located in the most e cient island only. (Put di erently, the distribution of liquidity at date 0 does not matter.) Moreover, competition among bankers implies that the (only) borrower on the market does not draw any bene t from leverage, and pro ts in the nancial sector are uniformly distributed across bankers (they all have the same pro t ).
Economy with Asymmetric Information Only
Under asymmetric information all bankers have access to the same borrowing rate and banker = 1 demands an in nite quantity of funds so long . In this case the equilibrium is unique and requires that = , which implies that only the most skillful banker borrows funds on the wholesale nancial market. In other terms, this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. The economy reaches the First Best equilibrium even though the s are privately observed.
Economy with Moral Hazard Only
As in the text, I solve the equilibrium in three steps. After having explicited bankers' participation and incentive compatibility constraints, I derive the optimal leverage that maximizes bankers' expected pro t under these constraints and determine the type of the marginal borrower . This permits me to derive the aggregate supply and demand curves (second step), and eventually solve for the equilibrium (third step). In equilibrium the expected return must be the same across borrowers; otherwise, all lenders would be willing to lend to the borrower with the highest expected return, and the market would not clear. Hence, the interest rate faced by borrower is equal to ( ) = (A1)
Using the participation constraint (PC) and relation (A1), one can determine the type of the marginal borrower ( )
Banker will become borrower only if the participation constraint (PC) is satis ed, that is if > . Because lenders observe the s they have the ability to deter cash diversion by denying loans to over-levered borrowers. Therefore, leverage depends on the s and is speci c to each banker: no banker will be willing to grant a loan to borrower if 's return from cash diversion (1 + ) is above both his expected return from retail lending, ( + ( )), and the return on wholesale lending, . Banker knows of this in advance, and so takes care never demand too high a loan , such that (
(1 + ) 6 max { ( + ( )) }
The above constraint is borrower 's incentive compatibility constraint and determines 's borrowing capacity. The program of borrower > consists in maximizing his expected pro t (1) for = ) under constraint (A3). Using relations (A1) and (A2) one can re-write 's incentive compatibility constraint as ( + ) 6 . Because this constraint would always be satis ed for borrower % 1 and aggregate demand would be in nite when + , in equilibrium one necessarily has + . For borrower , it is therefore optimal to demand funds as long as the loan is incentive compatible. Thus, constraint (A3) binds and 's loan demand is equal to ( ) = ( ) ( + )
Relation (A4) shows that leverage increases with banker's e ciency and productivity: 0 and 0. It also decreases with the market return: 0 because, all things being equal, a rise in the return required by the market increases the cost of debt and, therefore, the incentive to divert cash. Following a rise in , must diminish to maintain incentives. I am now in the position to derive the aggregate demand and supply curves. When 1 bankers prefer to consume early than to lend, and so the aggregate supply of funds is equal to zero. When 1, bankers [0 ) prefer to lend their unit of wealth rather consume early, while the rest of the bankers prefer to borrow. When = 1 bankers 6 are indi erent between early and late consumption, and so the aggregate supply is undetermined (but below ). Finally, when all bankers supply funds (i.e. = 1) and therefore aggregate supply equals 1. It follows that the 26 The max term on the right hand side emphazises that even low bankers have the option to demand a loan and then divert the cash. To keep notation light, I do not explicitly write as a function of but, of course, = ( ) is borrower-speci c.
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aggregate supply of funds takes the following form
On the demand side, when [ ] bankers > become borrowers and borrow ( ), so that aggregate demand equals Z 1 ( ) ( ) . As discussed above, when the most skillful banker ( = 1) is not nancially constrained and aggregate demand is in nite. Finally, when no banker wants to be a borrower, and aggregate demand is null. The aggregate demand ( ) can therefore be expressed as
where ( ) and ( ) are de ned in (A4) and (A2), respectively. 27 Noticing that = 1
when & 1 and that increases with , it is easy to see that the equilibrium market return is always above 1. Hence, there will be no liquidity hoarding in this economy and there exists one unique equilibrium characterized by the market return and leverage schedule { ( )} =1 =
, where solves relation (8) given the aggregate loan supply (A5) and demand (A6), ( ), and 1.
Derivation of Relation (5)
Using relation (3) I substitute into relation (2), which yields = ((1 + ) 2 (1 + )) and then, using (4), I substitute into the above relation, which yields = ( 2 ( ) (1 + )) 2 + ( + 2 ) = 0
Proof of Proposition 1
Condition of Existence of +. The wholesale market clears when ( ) = ( ) = (1 ) = (1 ) ( ) which is equivalent to (using (5) 
By construction ( ) is the very productivity level for which Note that lim &0 b ( ) = 1 implies that + always exists and is unique when there is no moral hazard (given assumption 1). In this case, + converges toward the rst best allocation described in appendix 7.1.1: + + and the market clears only when + = + = .
Condition of Existence of . From (6), (7) and (8), I know that exists if and only if (1) 6 (1 + ). Since
(1 + ) 6 0 and (1) > 0, and ( ) is (by construction) the productivity level for which (1) = (1 + ), exists if and only if 6 ( ). Functions b ( ) and ( ), and therefore the sets of parameters ( ) for which + or exist, are represented in gure A2. (5)). Similarly, one has: 6 0 comes from relation (4) and = 1, while > 0 comes from (1) 6 0 (from (5)).
Proof of Proposition 2
